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## The Establishment of Mulla Sadra's Philosophy: Main Concepts on Al-Hikmah Al-Muta'alliyah

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**Abstract:** *The purpose of this article is to review the main concepts of Mulla Sadra's philosophy. These ideas are the foundation of the al-Hikmah al-Muta'alliyah group of philosophy theory. This philosophy, along with al-Hikmah al-Masy'a'iyah and al-Hikmah al-Isyraiqiyah, is one of the three major groups in Islamic philosophy. This study used a descriptive analysis. The author reviews the main work of Mulla Sadra, namely al-Hikmah al-Muta'alliyah fil al-Sysfar 'Aqliyah Arba'ah and another book, namely Al-Masy'a'ir. Secondary references are also used, such as Mulla Sadra's other works and they're relevant to the subject of study. This study attempts to identify the six concepts that make up the philosophical theory of al-Hikmah al-Muta'alliyah, namely: the fundamental of wujûd (Ashalat al-Wujûd), the gradation of wujûd (Tâskîkal-Wujûd), the poverty of cause (Illiyah), the simple reality (Basith al-Haqîqah), the substance movement (al-Harakah al-Jawhayiah), and the unity of subject and object (Ittihad Aqil wa Ma'qûl). These concepts demonstrate that Mulla Sadra's philosophy has strong conceptual roots and is difficult to refute. As a result, Mulla Sadra's philosophy remains one of the most influential groups of Islamic philosophy.*

**Keywords:** mâhiyah, mulla sadra, wujûd

**Abstrak:** *Tujuan artikel ini adalah untuk meninjau konsep utama filsafat Mulla Sadra. Gagasan-gagasan inilah yang menjadi landasan teori filsafat kelompok al-Hikmah al-Muta'alliyah. Filsafat ini, bersama dengan al-Hikmah al-Masy'a'iyah dan al-Hikmah al-Isyraiqiyah, adalah salah satu dari tiga kelompok besar dalam filsafat Islam. Penelitian ini menggunakan analisis deskriptif. Penulis mengulas karya utama Mulla Sadra yaitu al-Hikmah al-Muta'alliyah fil al-Sysfar 'Aqliyah Arba'ah dan kitab lainnya yaitu Al-Masy'a'ir. Referensi sekunder juga digunakan, seperti karya Mulla Sadra yang lain dan karya-karya yang relevan dengan subjek penelitian. Kajian ini mencoba mengidentifikasi enam konsep yang menyusun teori filosofis Al-Hikmah Al-Muta'alliyah, yaitu: dasar wujûd (Ashalat al-Wujûd), gradasi wujûd (Tâskîkal-Wujûd), kemiskinan sebab (Illiyah), realitas sederhana (Basith al-Haqîqah), gerakan substansi (al-Harakah al-Jawhayiah), dan kesatuan subjek dan objek (Ittihad Aqil wa Ma'qûl). Konsep-konsep ini menunjukkan bahwa filosofi Mulla Sadra memiliki akar konseptual yang kuat dan sulit untuk dibantah. Sehingga, filsafat Mulla Sadra tetap menjadi salah satu aliran filsafat Islam yang paling berpengaruh.*

**Kata Kunci:** mâhiyah, mulla sadra, wujûd

## INTRODUCTION

There are several important concepts from the teachings of Mullâ Sadrâ, namely the fundamentals of *wujûd* (*ashalat al-wujûd*), the gradation of *wujûd* (*tâskîkal-wujûd*), the poverty of cause (*illiyah*), the simple nature (*basith al-haqîqah*), the substancial movement (*al-harakah al-jawhayiyah*), and the unity of subject and object (*ittihad aqil wa ma'qûl*). Each of these concepts will be described in detail to understand the philosophical ideas of Mullâ Sadrâ. And their ideas are related to the others. The whole thing depends on the main idea, namely the fundamental of existence (*ashalat al-wujûd*). All of the philosophical concepts that Mullâ Sadrâ initiated are unique in philosophy because they were born from responses to philosophical concepts, philosophical Sufism, and various variants of previous ideas. The study in this article uses a qualitative method with a descriptive analysis approach. I analyzed some of the works of Mullâ Sadrâ and the scholars who studied his thoughts (Khazaei, 2018).

In *ashalat al-wujûd* teaching system, Mullâ Sadrâ only accepts one pure existence. While others, namely *mâhiyâh*, is something that has never recognized the fundamental of existence (*ashalat al-wujûd*). The point is that *mâhiyâh*, or the essence of each entity, is not *wujûd*. In the meaning of *wujûd* as univocal, other than *wujûd* is non-existence ( Thabâthabâ'i, 1428, pp. 91–93). In Mullâ Sadrâ's philosophy, the status of *mâhiyâh* is to produce diversity from *wujûd* of the single form. All concepts of Mullâ Sadrâ's teachings, such as *tâskîkal-wujûd*, *ittihad aqil wa ma'qûl*, *illiyah* (the unity of cause and effect), and *basith al-haqîqah* *kullî al-asyâ'* are based on *ashalat al-wujûd*. The philosophy of Mullâ Sadrâ recognize *wujûd* as something singular, underlying all reality. In particular, the concepts of *basith al-haqîqah* (the simple essence) and *illiyah* (the unity of cause and effect, the poverty of causality), are very close to *wahdat al-wujûd* teaching, who sees existence as singular. Another ontological principle of Mullâ Sadrâ's philosophy is *tâskîkal wujûd* (gradation of existence) (Jome et al., 2020).

An understanding of the *ashalat al-wujûd* appears from the rational view that is divine or called Mullâ Sadrâ as *burhan nûr al-'arsyî* or generally known as the knowledge of *hudhûrî*. Mullâ Sadrâ describes this scheme using the *basith al-haqîqah* *kullî al-asyâ'* system (Shadrâ, 2002, pp. 17–18). When *Haqq Ta'âlâ* has no direction identified, but He is the simple essence of everything, He becomes the basis of reality (Thabâthabâ'i, n.d., p. 16). The whole reality is His presence; While all the plurality reached by the knowledge by confirmation (*hushlî*), is the work of the senses and intellect to understand the fundamental and straight forward of *wujûd* (Sadra, 2002a, pp. 16–17).

Using the *hushlî* system, Mullâ Sadrâ's philosophy can help to solve this problem by relying on *ma'qulat tsanî falsafî*. External reality as Mullâ Sadrâ's philosophy claims, is a reality that has a form then every extension is the content of *wujûd* and *mâhiyâh* (Nasr, 1989, p. 409). However, the form contained in one extension cannot be understood directly through the *ma'qulat awal*. Therefore, it needs to be examined using *ma'qulat tsanî falsafî*, is an intelligent system that is a cognitive domain discourse that refers to reality (Zuchron, 2017, pp. 74–75).

Through the identification of an extension as *mawjûd*, which is divided into existence (*wujûd*) and its thing (*mâhiyâh*), it is found that its *wujûd* is quite fundamental, while *mâhiyâh* is only a limitation for *wujûd*. By analyzing *wujûd* as, the form which is the area of analysis becomes the concept of existence (*wujûd dhîhnî*) (Rahman, 1975, p. 215). According to Mullâ Hâdî Sabzawârî and Sayyid Hussîn Thabattâbâ'i (Thabâthabâ'i, n.d.) who are followers of the teachings of Mullâ Sadrâ, if the concept of *wujûd* has been well understood, the reality of *wujûd* is automatically proven by itself. Therefore, what needs to be clarified is the concept of *wujûd* showing how *wujûd* is simple, and direction or place does not apply to it. (Sadra, 2002a) Mullâ Sadrâ says any discussion of *wujûd* is actually *wujûd dhîhnî* even though it is said that this is *wujûd kharijî*. Because anything that enters the realm of conceptual discussion can be conceptualized, it is discourse in the mental realm (Sadra, 2002b).

On the condition that it is clear from the start which discussion is about *wujûd dhîhnî* and which is about *wujûd kharijî*. Mistakes or errors in distinguishing *wujûd* discussions, whether in the form of *wujûd dhîhnî* or *wujûd kharijî*, have the fatal consequences. In the same way, Shihab al-Dîn al-Suhrawardî responded to Ibn Sînâ's ontology. However, Shihab al-Dîn al-Suhrawardî was not solely to blame in this case. Because Ibn Sînâ did not make a clear distinction between the two types of *wujûd* (*wujûd dhîhnî* and *wujûd kharijî*) in his philosophical activities. Nasr al-Dîn Thusî was the first to explain which discussion of *wujûd dhîhnî* and which discussion of *wujûd kharijî* in Ibn Sînâ's philosophy was which. Nasr al-Dîn Thusî's contribution facilitated Mullâ Sadrâ's philosophical activities (Shadrâ, 2002). However, it related to the concept of *wujûd*, the discourse on *wujûd dhîhnî* is a reference for *wujûd kharijî*. As it is the mind of a mirror for reality (Meisami, 2010).

*Wujûd dhîhnî* is the proof of the existence of *wujûd kharijî* which is the basis for reality. The basis of reality is *wujûd*, which appears as the effects from *mawjd* to its *wujûd*, not its *mâhiyâh*. As a concept, *wujûd* becomes a unifying all *mâhiyâh*. In the propositions "There is a chair", "There is a rock", "There is a goat", the unifying element is "existence" or *wujûd*. Even though in the realm of *dhîhnî* the basic is *mâhiyâh*, with *wujûd dhîhnî* being a unifier for *mâhiyâh* then with the view that *wujûd dhîhnî* is a mirror for *wujûd kharijî* then in reality, what fundamental is *wujûd*. At the same time, *mâhiyâh* is only something that can be grasped by perception and intellect. It is necessary to recognize *wujûd* of external reality by using the knowledge of *hudhûrî*, and it does not use the conceptual explanation for its exception (Al Walîd, 2012).

According to Mullâ Sadrâ's teachings, the external sensed reality is a single, unambiguous entity. It becomes a duplicate of *wujûd*, which refers to its existence, and *mâhiyâh*, which refers to its non-existence, when physically and emotionally analyzed. In the mental realm, *mâhiyâh* becomes fundamental, while *wujûd* or its existence is only a predicate for *mâhiyâh*. For example, in every premise "humans exist", "tables exist", "trees exist", the word "exists" is always only a predicate for each *mâhiyâh* (Nasr, 2006). Conceptually, *wujûd* is always an addition to *mâhiyâh*, but in reality, *wujûd* becomes the basis for reality. *Wujûd* cannot be defined because that definition requires the existence of a genus and a difference, both of which *wujûd*

lacks. It is the single underlying reality, even though it cannot be defined (Muhammad Kamal, 2019).

Regarding the state of the basic (reality of *wujûd*), Mullâ Sadrâ states: "Indeed, the essence of all things is existence, which gives effect (to reality) and makes it visible. So, *wujûd* is the basis for everything which is the (only) possessor of essence. While everything acquires the essence (because of *wujûd*), then he (*wujûd*), (is) the essence of everything (which has essence). And he (*wujûd*) does not need anything (to exist), in fact it is the other that needs him to exist. So, he (*wujûd*) exists naturally in reality. If other entities (*mâhiyâh*) are found in definite reality together with *wujûd*, it is impossible to exist alone" (Sadra, 1992, p. 10).

Thus, every entity in external reality, such as "the human exists", "the chair exists", "the horse exists", and other necessitates the existence of a single thing that unites all the *mâhiyâh*. In this case, what unites is *wujûd*, because *wujûd* does not depend on anything, while every *mâhiyâh* is limitations. *Mâhiyâh* only makes all entities obtain their specific identity, *mâhiyâh* is not the creator of each entity. While every entity in that reality is known to exist, exists; The giver of existence or what makes each entity exist is *wujûd*. As Mullâ Sadrâ explained above, every *mâhiyâh* entity never exists by itself in reality. Every *mâhiyâh* must exist with *wujûd*. In fact, that form is what makes it exist. Thus, *wujûd* becomes the basis for reality and gives the effect.

Another proof by Mullâ Sadrâ in *al-Masyâ'ir* about the basis of *wujûd* on external reality is what giving the effect to external reality is *wujûd*. While *mâhiyâh* is just a mental projection that has no reference to reality. The opposite of existence is non-existence; Mullâ Sadrâ states that the basic meaning of *wujûd* is that existence does not need any intermediary to exist, and its existence is by itself. When acknowledging *wujûd* as something that exists by itself, *wujûd* has existed beyond time and is permanent. These explanations show that Mullâ Sadrâ's philosophy was built on the basis of a single basic *wujûd*. This concept is the basis for explaining various other teaching concepts, such as *tâskîkal-wujûd*, *illiyyah*, *basit al-haqîqah*, and *ittihad aqil wa ma'qûl*.

### THE GRADATION OF EXISTENCE (*TÂSKÎK AL-WUJÛD*)

The concept of *tâskîk al-wujûd* or the gradation of existence in Mullâ Sadrâ's philosophy can only be understood and accepted on the condition that the person has understood and accepted the fundamental principle of existence (*ashalatal-wujûd*) which is an important part of Mullâ Sadrâ's philosophy (Sadra, 1992). The fundamental of *wujûd* is to believe that external reality is the basis of *wujûd* it self. While *mâhiyâh* only exists in the mental realm as a barrier to *wujûd*, the intellect can recognize it. *Wujûd* is the only absolute in external reality that can only be recognized using *mâhiyâh* (Nasr, 2006). In *tâskîkal-wujûd*, unity fills the whole plurality; plurality flows in unity, plurality returns in unity. The phrase "plurality flows in unity" indicates that plurality is actually the appearance of unity in modes of extension.

By understanding or accepting the basic principle of *wujûd*, then *tâskîk al-wujûd* can be understood or accepted. *Tâskîk al-wujûd* is the path taken by Mullâ Sadrâ to

explain the relationship between oneness and diversity. In the *tâskîk al-wujûd* system, plurality is accepted as being in *wujûd*. The aspect of the similarities is the aspect of the difference (*mâ bî al-isytarak, ‘ain mâ bihi al-ikhtiâf*). The analogy of similarity to difference can be compared to light. The similarity is in light, one hundred degrees is light and ten degrees is light. The difference is also in the light itself; The difference is in intensity. The different intensities (to be compounded) are similar, namely light. In the *tâskîk al-wujûd* system, one entity has a different reference. For example, the difference in quality (Rahman, 1975).

There is no difference in totality in the *tâskîk al-wujûd* system because if it is entirely different, there is no diversity or unity in it. There will be no diversity if *tâskîk al-wujûd* is entirely singular. *Tâskîk* only exists in *wujûd*, while in *mâhiyâh* does not exist because it does not have an absolutely aspect of similarity. The conditions in *tasyikikal-wujud* are the unity of *wujûd* is real, plurality of *wujûd* is real, plurality returns to unity, and unity flows into plurality.

The impression can be captured in this case is the acknowledgment that plurality actually returns to the unity and that unity flows into pluralism so that plurality is not really separated from the singularity. Pluralism is always in unity; Unity is always manifest in plurality. Therefore, it is impressive that what is truly real is oneness. Pluralism is real, but in unity. Therefore, when asked the question, “What is the status of pluralism?” Then the answer is, “Plurality is unity.”

Pluralism must be genuine for the gradation to apply. At the same time, unity must be genuine; otherwise, there is no connection to pluralism. Pluralism flows into singleness, and plurality flows back into singleness. Therefore, all pluralism is actually based on one essence, namely singleness. Pluralism is only in quality (Jabir, 2012, p. 73). Because the quality is at the level of accident, plurality is actually just an accident, and accident is a mental projection, it doesn't have any real things. However, some of Mullâ Sadrâ's adherents, including Muhammad Taqî Misbâh Yazdî, did not agree with this result. Sadrian argues that pluralism must exist because nothing can be called unity unless it does (Supriatna, 2020).

Some other scholars of Mullâ Sadrâ argue that every different entity found in external reality is not an absolute difference. There is an aspect of similarity in these differences that it makes *wujûd* of each diversity can be abstracted. Abstraction can also only be done if there is diversity. Therefore, there is a single entity that underlies diversity. The difference among the various entities is in a single *wujûd* will be graded.

In the *tâskîk al-wujûd* system, the proof of the gradation is indeed real in external reality is that there is an earlier *wujûd*, such as *wujûd* of mind and *wujûd* of imaginary. Some forms of *wujûd* are stronger, such as *wujûd* of cause, and others are weaker, such as *wujûd* of effect. This view differs from *wahdat al-wujûd* and certainly does not have anything in common with previous philosophical ideas. However, Mullâ Sadrâ claims that the notion of *tâskîk al-wujûd* does not contradict the Sufi view of *wahdat al-wujûd*. Mulla Sadrâ explained:

*“It should be understood that our proof of the different levels of wujûd and laying the foundation for the stages of discussion and teaching on their diversity and plurality (wujûd)*

*does not contradict what we will prove in the next discussion (Insha Allah). That is about proving that *wujūd* and *mawjd* are essentially what the *aulia* and *'urafā'* believe, in which they are all people who have gained inner revelation and have acquired the essential knowledge." (Sadra, 2002a)*

However, it appears that Mullâ Sadrâ is emphasizing in the above statement that the concept of *tâskîk al-wujûd* is a synthesis of previous ideas. This discourse is based on the ideas of Ibn Sînâ. Because receiving *mumkin al-wujûd* absolutely depend on *wajib al-wujûd*, should Ibn Sînâ accept unity of existence. But on the contrary, he actually accepted plurality of existence on external reality. In fact, the meaning of absolute dependence *mumkin al-wujûd* to *wajib al-wujûd bî nafsihî* so that *mumkin al-wujûd* become *wajîb al-wujûd bî ghayrihî*, show the plurality *wajîb al-wujûd bî ghayrihî* is actually a unity as well as plurality in gradation status (*taskik*).

Fazlur Rahman as a serious reviewer of Ibn Sînâ's thought said that Ibn Sînâ accepted the duality of *wujûd* and *mâhiyâh* of external realities. Therefore, Fazlur Rahman criticized Mullâ Sadrâ's thought that he was not right relying on Ibn Sînâ's thought to criticize the opinion of Shihab al-Dîn al-Suhrawardî to emphasize that what is real in reality is *wujûd*, not *mâhiyâh*. Actually, Mullâ Sadrâ was correct in using Ibn Sînâ's argument to highlight the view that what is real in external reality is *wujûd*. Because actually Ibn Sînâ, as explained by Nasr al-Dîn Thûsî, meant to say that in fact the duality of *wujûd* and *mâhiyâh* (in Ibn Sînâ's view) is in the mental realm, not in external reality. In this case, Fazlur Rahman follows Ibn Rusyd's interpretation of Ibn Sînâ's thought. The views of Ibn Rusyd and Fazlur Rahman believe that the duality of *wujûd* and *mâhiyâh* on external reality seems to make consistency with the view of plurality of forms on external reality held by Ibn Sînâ (Nasim, 2010).

For this reason, although in several other sections of the discussion Fazlur Rahman admits that Mullâ Sadrâ took the interpretation of Nasr al-Dîn Thûsî, in this section he does not. Therefore, actually Mullâ Sadrâ accepted Ibn Sînâ's idea as interpreted by Nasr al-Dîn Thûsî that the difference between *wujûd* and *mâhiyâh* is in the mental realm. But unfortunately, Ibn Sînâ instead accepts the idea that *wujûd* is real in external reality, but is plural based on differences in *mâhiyâh*. In fact, *mâhiyâh* is a mental projection. Mullâ Sadrâ also accepts pluralism, but understanding pluralism based on the plurality of *mâhiyâh* in the mental realm, so actually Mullâ Sadrâ's idea is very close to *wahdat al-wujûd* and, at the same time, has straightened Ibn Sînâ's conclusions. In another perspective, it can be interpreted that Mullâ Sadrâ accepts the plurality of real forms in external reality as a consequence of the accommodation of the philosophical system. For this reason, the notion of *tâskîk al-wujûd* has been interpreted in various ways by the scholars of Mullâ Sadrâ. In this case, it can be assumed that the idea of *tâskîk al-wujûd* wants to synthesize the teachings of Ibn Sînâ and Ibn 'Arab, as well as the teachings of Shihab al-Dîn al-Suhrawardî (Rizvi, 2021).

The idea of *tâskîk* itself was formulated from the spirit of Shihab al-Dîn al-Suhrawardî's light manifestation spirit. Meanwhile, it can be seen that the *wahdat al-wujûd* Sufis did not explain the idea of gradation (*tâskîk*), however, as stated above, Mullâ Sadrâ claims that this idea is in line with the *wahdat al-wujûd*. This claim raises the view of the Sadrian group to emphasize that the teachings of Mullâ Sadrâ are

indeed very suitable to be interpreted as a philosophical Sufism teaching like Ibn 'Arab and others. However, some other Sadians cannot accept such a view because they can clearly find that the concept of *tâskîk al-wujûd* is different from the teachings of *wahdat al-wujûd*. The debate is still ongoing to this day.

### THE POVERTY OF CAUSE (*ILLÎYAH*)

Another essential part that makes Mullâ Sadrâ's philosophical teachings unique is the concept of poverty resulting from causality (*Illiyah*). Causality is to show what the actual relationship between cause and effect is. Causality is an important part of the class of philosophy and *kalâm*. Mutakallimîn considers the necessity depending on the cause on the reason is on the side of its novelty. Meanwhile, Mullâ Sadrâ argues the necessity of depending on the cause can affect the status of the dependent form (*mumkîn*, contingent) on the form of the cause. As long as it exists, the form of the effect always depends on the form of the cause (Riahi, 2015, p. 19).

In the view of *kâlâm*, the form of effect is independent of the form of cause. The form of effect is new, while the form of cause is permanent; Therefore, the two are considered different. In the view of mutakallimîn, cause and effect have different forms. Another cause exists, another effect exists (Nasution, 2017). Likewise, in *al-Hikmah al-Masyâ'iyyah* then there are other causes, other effects exist. All entities in external reality have different forms. In fact, the effect in the view of *al-Hikmah al-Masyâ'iyyah*, is exactly the same as the cause because *al-Hikmah al-Masyâ'iyyah* accepts that the effect is absolute. As *mukmin al-wujûd*, the effect depends absolutely on *wajîb al-wujûd bî bâfsîhî*. The dependence of the effect on the cause as the dependence of *mumkîn* on *wajîb* is precisely the dependence of the copula on the subject; The copula has absolutely no existence, and the copula is entirely subservient to the subject. Thus, the dependence of the effect as *mumkîn* on the cause as a *wajîb*, following the philosophical view of Mulla Sadrâ. (Kartanegara, 2006, pp. 82–83)

By accepting *mumkîn al-wujûd* as a consequence, even though it has become a *wajîb al-wujûd bî ghayrîhî*, it is still the result of *wajîb al-wujûd bî nafsîhî*. Meanwhile, *al-Hikmah al-Masyâ'iyyah* argues that, in each *wajîb al-wujûd bî ghayrîhî* it is different from other *wajîb al-wujûd bî ghayrîhî* because of the differences in each *mâhiyâh*. Therefore, it is certain that every *wajîb al-wujûd bî ghayrîhî* as a consequence, depends on the Single Being, namely *wajîb al-wujûd bî nafsîhî* which is the cause. However, this acknowledgment does not exist in *al-Hikmah al-Masyâ'iyyah*. For this reason, Mullâ Sadrâ seemed to justify *al-Hikmah al-Masyâ'iyyah* (Rahman, 1975). Another reason *al-Hikmah al-Masyâ'iyyah* argues that the form of cause and effect is different is because of the consequences of their views which distinguish *wujûd* on external reality according to each *mâhiyâh*.

Mullâ Sadrâ sees the effect as something that is completely dependent on the cause in his quest to perfect philosophy. In fact, this viewpoint is inspired by the concept of *al-Hikmah al-Masyâ'iyyah*'s of *mumkîn al-wujûd* as a result that is entirely dependent on *wajîb al-wujûd* as a cause. However, *mumkîn al-wujûd* is only suitable for the basic system of *mâhiyâh*. Because in fact, in the fundamentals of being, what is real should only be existence, while other than that is a conceptual reality. Therefore, the

effect must be regarded as something that has no existence, unless its existence is the presence of a cause. In fact, the effect has no substance, so the effect is not an addition to the significance of the effect, because the true substance of the effect is the effect itself ('ain al-rabit bî al-illah). This is because the consequence is absolute poverty (Jabir, 2012). Mullâ Sadrâ's philosophical system argues that consequences are poverty. The effect depends absolutely on the cause so it is called *rabit illî*. Because in a causal system based on the fundamentals of being, existence can only be divided into independent entities which are seen as causes (*mustaqil*) and forms that depend absolutely on the existence of causes (*rabit*) (Jabir, 2012).

The *wujûd* of effect in the propositional system is seen as a copula as a link between the subject and the predicate. For example, in the proposition "Ahmad is the author", a copula has absolutely no independence. The word "is" is completely dependent (*rabit*), has no independence. Those who have independence (*mustaqil*) are only "Ahmad" and "author" because they can be understood independently. A copula only functions as a link for the subject and predicate. The word "Ahmad" and the word "author" its references can be found in external reality, while the copula has no reference to external reality. Copula only aims to show the real subject information on external reality. Therefore, the copula status as an explanation for the effect status in the causality system, only has a name, but has no form.

In the system of causality, Mullâ Sadrâ has emphasized that actually the effect is not an independent fact. The effect is something that cannot be separated from the effect. In this regard, Mullâ Sadrâ wrote:

*"In this case, Mullâ Sadrâ wants to explain that in fact the effect has absolutely no existence. The result is absolute poverty. The essence of the effect is none other than, its poverty on the cause; The essence of the effect is only the effect itself. In this case, nature only belongs to the form of cause (*mustaqil*), while the status of the effect is like a copula (*râbith*). The copula itself is thought to exist only in the mental realm." (Sadra, 2002b, p. 244)*

However, there is something similar to *wujûd rabith* in external reality, namely accidental form. Like "white" as an accidental form which in external reality can only exist by becoming a trait for other forms, like white in an external reality which can only exist as an accident for a wall. However, the accidental form exists even though it is an attribute for others, just as white is an attribute for a wall. While the copula for itself does not have existence, the copula's existence is dependence itself. Thus, the status of each extension (*mawjûdat*) does not have any existence (*wujûd*), its existence is dependence itself.

In the Mullâ Sadrâ causal copula system, the essence of the effect is the effect itself. Otherwise, the cause becomes an addition to the essence of the effect, so the effect does not need a cause. This is impossible because the effect depends absolutely on the cause. The essence of the result is absolute necessity and poverty. There is nothing in effect, except dependence itself on cause. In the causal copula system, in external reality, there is only one form on which reality is based. However, in mental analysis, there are three entities: the cause that gives form, the effect that gives form, and the activity of giving form.

## THE SIMPLE ESSENCE (*BASITH AL-HAQIQAH*)

The concept of *basith al-haqiqah* (the simple essence) is everything and nothing from it, written: (بَسْطِ الْحَقِيقَةِ كُلِّيًّا وَلَيْسَا بِشَيْءٍ مِّنْهَا), is actually the entrance to the foundation and basic principle of the entire building of *al-Hikmah al-Muta'alliyah*. Mullâ Sadrâ explains this in more detail in his work (Sadra, 2002a). In fact, this principle is what conveys other principles in the philosophical concepts of Mullâ Sadrâ, including the fundamentals of existence (*aslât al-wujûd*), which is one of the essential foundations of their teachings (Sadra, 2002a). Through the principle of *basit al-haqiqah* (simple essence), Mullâ Sadrâ not only wanted to solve many philosophical problems handed down by the earlier philosophers, but also this foundation would solve the problems of other groups of thought; such as *kâlâm* especially regarding the oneness of God and regarding the relationship between the Essence and the Attributes of God.

The *basith al-haqiqah* concept is a new breakthrough in Islamic philosophy. Shihab al-Dîn al-Suhrawardî has pointed out the failure of definition as a prerequisite for propositions in philosophy. Then, he asserts that it is only with *hudhûr* knowledge that true knowledge can be obtained (Suhrawardi, 1979, pp. 11–16). Accepting the opinion of Shihab al-Dîn al-Suhrawardî, Mullâ Sadrâ carried out a philosophical revolution from the definition system to the presentation system (*hudhûrî*) as a pre-requisite for propositions. Mullâ Sadrâ admitted that the concept of the simple nature they introduced resulted from deep contemplation and reflection, so the hijab was open for them. Therefore, Mullâ Sadrâ gained presentation knowledge. In various biographies of Mullâ Sadrâ's biography, it is stated that he contemplated for fifteen years until he acquired the knowledge of presentation. This knowledge became the basis for Mullâ Sadrâ writing his philosophy in *Asfar* and several other books, such as *al-Hikmah Arsyiyah*, '*al-Masyâ'ir*, and so on.

The experience of presentation (*hudhûrî*) is called Mullâ Sadrâ as the *hikmah 'arsiyah malakûtî Ilahî*. Therefore, Mullâ Sadrâ's philosophical activities can be said to be a supreme philosophy on the grounds that he makes definite, clear, and convincing knowledge, namely the knowledge by presence, a fundamental element of his philosophical activities. By Mullâ Sadrâ, this knowledge is called *burhan 'arsyî* (Sadra, 2002a) because the philosophical proof that he did was to justify the highest knowledge or *al-hikmah al-ilahiyyah* through philosophical arguments. This system makes Mullâ Sadrâ's philosophy have a solid argumentation base; Such a system needs to be encouraged in the development of philosophy and knowledge.

The concept of *basit al-haqiqah* can only be obtained through '*ilmû ladunnî* (Sadra, 2002a). The basis of knowledge obtained in this way or called *hudhûr* science is considered a prerequisite for quality philosophy by Mullâ Sadrâ and his followers. Agree with Shihab al-Dîn al-Suhrawardî's emphasis that true philosophers are those who acquire basic knowledge through presentation and are able to present their knowledge with systematic and solid philosophical arguments. It is acknowledged that some philosophers who follow Mullâ Sadrâ will not be perfect in carrying out philosophical activities if they have not earned *burhân 'arsyî* or *kasyaf*. Based on the

presentation experience, Mullâ Sadrâ carried out systematic philosophical activities through solid arguments (Miswari, 2016b, p. 178).

In the concept of *basit al-haqîqah*, means the reality of everything is simple, not duplicate or not composite with anything. Its simplicity does not consist of various duplicates, whether it is material and form duplicates, genera and differentia duplicates, *wujûd* and *mâhiyâh* duplicates, or *wujdin* (existent) and *fiqdan* (non-existent) duplicates. *Basit al-haqîqah* is free from various types of duplicates. It is simple, not duplicated beyond the genus and differentiation which is called the Absolute Being. In *Wahdat al-Wujûd*, it is called *Wujûd Haqq Ta'ala*.

*"The scope of the essence of all mawjudat, is not like the universality of particularities, and (nor it is the case of universal predication of particulars). This is because the essence of wujud is not a genus, species, or kuli tabi'i (universal natural). However, the scope (essence of wujûd) differs from the (universal) capabilities."* (Sadra, 1992)

As Mullâ Sadrâ explained above, *wujûd* is simple and includes everything, but not everything itself. The scope of *wujûd* is not same as the universalia of particulars, nor of the scope of genus over species. In this case, *wujûd* cannot be defined because everything that can be defined is things with genus and differesia, while *wujûd* does not have genus and different.

In external reality, there is a form that references *basit al-haqîqah* as absolute simplicity. As absolute simplicity, its existence possesses the perfection of everything. As the perfection of everything, *basit al-haqîqah* has the ideal of everything, not being everything, so that *basit al-haqîqah* becomes everything. This is because everything is perfect in form. Therefore, *basit al-haqîqah* is the form of everything, but not everything because everything is a composition of *wujûd* and *mâhiyâh*. *Wujûd* is the reality of everything, while *mâhiyâh* is a mental projection.

Although it is acknowledged that the inspiration for the concept of simple nature is from the experience of *hudhûrî*, Mullâ Sadrâ maintains his argument as with other concepts, such as *ashalat al-wujûd*, *tâskik al-wujûd*, *illiyyah*, and others, namely with a philosophical approach. *Basit al-haqîqah* argumentation is built on at least three premises. First, based on *ashalat al-wujûd* and *tâskik al-wujûd*. The chain of causality starts from the top of the pyramid of existence to the lowest form, namely the form of the material world. Second, as in the discussion of causality, the fundamental cause is that which gives form or perfection to the effect, so the cause has an ideal based on the philosophical principles if it does not have it, it is impossible to give. Therefore, the form of cause or *basit al-haqîqah* must have the perfection contained in the next level of existence. Third, in the pyramid scheme of *wujûd*, the various *mawjûdat* that exist at the lower levels have duplicates; both duplicate with *mâhiyâh* or duplicate perfectly and imperfectly. The most perfect is the simple nature because it has no duplicates. Based on the three premises of the argument, it can be concluded that the essential simplicity of *basit al-haqîqah* is because it does not have duplicates, so everything (*al-asyâ'*) is essentially in a simple nature (*basit al-haqiq*). Everything is an emanation of simple essence (Al-Kindi, 1974, p. 14); in everything is the presence of *basit al-haqîqah*. This scheme is the same as the *tâskik al-wujûd* contained in one *wujûd*.

Although it accepts only one form attributed to the single *Haqq Ta'ala*, Wahdat al-*Wujūd* and the philosophy of Mullâ Sadrâ are not the same as nihilism which denies the existence of external reality. These two teachings do not reject external realities other than *Haqq Ta'ala*. Mullâ Sadrâ's philosophy argues that apart from *Haqq Ta'ala* as a manifestation (*tajallî*) or appearance (*zuhûr*) *Haqq Ta'ala* also occurs in the Names of *Haqq Ta'ala*. Meanwhile, Mullâ Sadrâ's philosophy argues that the form is single and at the same time graded.

### TRANS-SUBSTANCE MOVEMENT (*AL-HARAKAH AL-JAWHAYIYAH*)

The trans-substance movement (*al-harakah al-jawhayiyah*) is a revolution carried out by Mullâ Sadrâ in the system of philosophical thought. Previously, philosophers accepted the principle of Aristotelian teaching which emphasized that motion only occurs at the level of accident. For Mullâ Sadrâ, accidental change is due to its moving substance. The motion of the substance formulated by Mullâ Sadrâ is influenced the movement of love, especially the teachings in *wahdat al-wujûd* of Ibn 'Arabî. With the movement of the substance, the change of one form entity into another form of entity is a necessity. This opinion is in line with the principle of *tasykîk al-wujûd*, which Mullâ Sadrâ himself formulated.

There are at least three arguments attributed to Mullâ Sadrâ's proposition in proving the motion of substance. (1) The first premise: (a) accidental change is a natural consequence of a change in substance; the closest agent of improbable motion outside matter because it must be from the material itself. This means from the substance. The second premise: (b) because the motion must move. If the immediate cause is constant, even though there is no intermediary between the subject and the object, then the object must be the same. For example, the light of a moving lamp indicates a comforting lamp. (2) The first premise: (a) accident is not separated from the substance; even an accident is the emission of substance: (b) every change that occurs in the emission (accident) is an indication of changes in the source (substance). In conclusion: accidental motion is evidence of substance motion. This second argument is built on the radiance-like emission of light, an approach that is more suitable than the first argument, which is causal which may be considered partial. (3) Mullâ Sadrâ stated time is the fourth dimension of the characteristics of matter. Therefore, timing is a necessity for the matter. Obviously, this inevitability occurs in the substance, the consequence is that every matter must be in constant motion (Thabâthabâ'i, 1428).

Motion is the first perfection of something potential. Potential is viewed from its existence as potential (*kamal al-awwal li ma bi al-quwwah min haitsu inna hu bi al-quwwah*). The meaning of "first perfection" (*kamal al-awwal*) the actuality of something is as the substance of the accidental locus to participate in actualization. The meaning of "potential in terms of its existence of potentiality" (*min haitsu innahu bî al-quwwah*) is the perfection of the first potentiality for actualizing a new potential, which becomes the actuality of the first potentiality. For this reason, motion is also defined as "the release of something from its potential, towards a gradual actualization" (*khuruju al-syai 'i min al-quwwah ila al-fi 'il tadrijan*). Motion is perfection (*kamal*) but perfection in motion differs from perfection in others. Perfection in motion is the first perfection in which there is a perfect potential to prepare for the subsequent actualization. Motion

is a process of continuous renewal of the form of an entity; Motion is a continual journey as a process of the emergence of a being from potentiality to actuality.

Motion in accidents occurs in four categories of accidents, namely quality (*al-kaif*), quantity (*al-kam*), place (*al-ain*), and position (*al-wadh'*). The existence of motion in these four categories was recognized by philosophers generally before Mullâ Sadrâ. As for Mullâ Sadrâ, he sees that the motion that applies to the four categories of accidents can occur because of the motion in the substance. Mullâ Sadrâ explained:

*"For Mullâ Sadrâ, the relation of accident and substance is one reality; this is a consequence of the principle of the unity of being. Accidents are conditions of substance not the establishment of two entities. Mullâ Sadrâ said that the relation between substance and accident is an illuminative relation (idhafah isyraqiyah). Motion in substance is the source of all motion in its accidental categories, namely quantity, quality, position, and place; The cause of the motion is one form."* (Sadra, 2002c, p. 69)

In motion there are six elements, movers (*muharrik*), moved (*mutaharrik*), starting point (*mabda'*), ending point (*muntaha* or *ghayah*), moving aspects (*mâ fihi al-harakah*), and time (*zaman*). Mullâ Sadrâ explains that the mover is *wujûd*. The starting point is *wujûd bî al-kuwwah* (potential). The end point is *wujûd wujûd bî al-al-fi'il* (actual). The moving aspect is the mode of presence of the mover (*muharrik*) in the form of substance and the four accidents involved in motion. Time is a mental abstraction of a moving being. The view of unity between substance and accident which necessitates the concept of movement of substance in Mullâ Sadrâ's philosophy cannot be denied as an affirmation of the concept of the unity of being; as acknowledged by the *wahdat al-wujûd* thinker. Mullâ Sadrâ tries to explain that the unity of *wujûd* is a gradual form of unity (*taskîk*). Mullâ Sadrâ teaches *wujûd* is one, but graded (*tasykîk*). The *tasykîk* system is inspired by the teachings of Shihab al-Dîn al-Suhrawardî about the illumination of light. The difference in one form is in the precedence-backwardness or perfection-imperfection. (Nasr, 1989)

In the teachings of Mullâ Sadrâ, *wujûd* is simple and includes everything. *Wujûd* fills the whole reality but each entity is not a form. In philosophical theory in the discourse on the categorization of forms, Mullâ Sadrâ accepts the principle of the division of form by Ibn Sînâ. Mullâ Sadrâ accepts the categorization of forms, namely *Wâjib al-Wujûd lî nafsihî*, *wâjib al-wujûd lî ghayrihî*, *mumkîn al-wujûd*, and *mumtanî 'al-wujûd*. The difference from Ibn Sînâ is that Mullâ Sadrâ does not accept the division of the entity of existence for each *mawjûdat* to external reality (*kharij*). The basics of being referred to by Ibn Sînâ and Mullâ Sadrâ are different. For Ibn Sînâ, *wujûd* is indeed based on reality, but each *wujûd* differs in its *mâhiyah*. Meanwhile, for Mullâ Sadrâ, *wujûd* is based on external reality and simultaneously encompasses everything. Mullâ Sadrâ agrees with Ibn Sînâ in the distinction between *wujûd* and *mâhiyah* in the conceptual realm. When it enters the conceptual realm, *wujûd* is only a predicate that is not fundamental and *mâhiyah* becomes a fundamental subject. Therefore, *wujûd* only becomes an addition to *mâhiyah* in the mental realm, while in external reality it is *wujûd* that is fundamental (Toussi, 2020).

The idea of Mullâ Sadrâ's ontology is very close to *wahdat al-wujûd* of Ibn 'Arab. The principle of unity of *wujûd* is the teaching of 'îrfân while Mullâ Sadrâ engages in dialogue with philosophy intensely, so he cannot accept *wahdat al-wujûd*, unless placed in the *tasykîk al-wujûd* system and *basîth haqîqat kulli asyyâ'* (*wujûd* as a simple entity, but includes everything). This idea of the unity and fundamentality of being has consequences for Mullâ Sadrâ's understanding of motion, thus formulating the concept of motion of substance. The motion of substance is the movement towards perfection; in itself as the actuality of the physical form as well as potentiality. This potentiality becomes actual when the soul is separated from body, and the soul has been separated from the body is pure actuality (Kerwanto, 2015). Since the motion of the substance is a process towards perfection, it is impossible for a reverse motion to occur; something that is more than perfect becomes less than perfect is impossible. The movement towards perfection is dynamic and trustworthy actuality is a state after the soul has separated from the body, so for Mullâ Sadrâ, reincarnation is impossible (Al Makin, 2018).

The philosophical system built by Mullâ Sadrâ can explain spiritual experiences based on rational arguments. It can be said that what Mullâ Sadrâ did was a breakthrough in Islamic thought. Mullâ Sadrâ believes motion is not only at the level of accident but also substance. The motion of the soul, for example, is knowledge by presence, such as increasing or decreasing feelings of love or hate. Accidental motion is actually a sign of substance motion.

### THE UNITY OF SUBJECT AND OBJECT (*ITTIHAD AQIL WA MA'QÛL*)

In Mullâ Sadrâ's philosophy, knowledge is the unity of subject and object. This concept is part of the idea of unity and the basics of being. The principle of this system of knowledge is the acceptance of the science of presentation (*hudhûrî*), which is a system of philosophical Sufism. Mullâ Sadrâ developed the system in a philosophical system. Therefore, his philosophy cannot be separated from the teachings of *wahdat al-wujûd* (von Stosch et al., 2019).

Further, Mullâ Sadrâ formulated the epistemological system, and representative knowledge, divided into conceptions (*tasawwur*) and affirmations (*tasydiq*). A proposition can only be limited to a conception, an affirmation can also accompany it. Conception is an acceptance of a statement without judgment, for example an assessment of whether the statement is true or accepted or the statement is not true or not accepted (Miswari, 2016b). In representational knowledge, based on the diversity of references, it is divided into universal (*kullî*), namely plural references, such as "human", "city", and single references, such as "Sukarno", "Jakarta". In addition (Miswari, 2016a). Mullâ Sadrâ's philosophical epistemology also accepts the division of knowledge in the form of axiomatic knowledge (*bâdihi*) and theoretical knowledge (*nâzharî*). Axiomatic knowledge is knowledge obtained without inference or deduction, while theoretical knowledge is knowledge obtained through belief or deduction (Nasution, 2018, pp. 39–40).

In his idea, Mullâ Sadrâ argues that empirical knowledge is the beginning of knowledge. However, the ratio also plays an essential role in determining or constructing knowledge through the faculties of the soul which include the senses

(hiss), fantasy (*khayalî*), estimation (*wahmî*), and intellect (*buhânî*). In addition to accommodating realists as well as empiricists, Mullâ Sadrâ's philosophy can also be said to be a realist philosophy because he accepts presentational knowledge (*hudhûrî*) and makes it a more basic system of knowledge. The epistemological system of presentation science (*hudhûrî*) in Mullâ Sadrâ's philosophy recognizes that the nature of reality (its existence) can be known through the presence of the subject to the object with the unity between subject and object or in philosophy the term is called *ittihad aqil wa ma'qûl* (Al-Walid, 2005, pp. 114–115). This system requires three aspects in the knowledge system, namely the subject who knows ('*aqil*), the object that is known (*ma'qûl*), and knowledge ('*aql*) as a knowledge process. This system is similar to the knowledge system of God in *wahdat al-wujûd* teaching (Khajeazad et al., 2021).

The achievement of presentational knowledge (*hudhûrî*) is the highest achievement of Mullâ Sadrâ's philosophy so that it is called *al-hikmah al-muta'alliyah*. Shihab al-Dîn al-Suhrawardî has actually pioneered this kind of philosophy. According to Shihab al-Dîn al-Suhrawardî, a good philosopher has attained the highest knowledge, but can present his testimony rationally. Mullâ Sadrâ and his followers well respect the warning of Shihab al-Dîn al-Suhrawardî. In this case, Muhammad Taqî Misbâh Yazdî said, the rational building of philosophy should follow the science of presentation so that philosophy and Sufism are actually two required fields of science (Taqî Misbâh Yazdî, 1990, pp. 85–86).

According to the Mullâ Sadrâ system, knowledge is the soul's presence in the object. The soul is the natural body's highest perfection, the container containing the potential of life (Amuli, 1386, p. 73) The ultimate meaning of perfection is essential that constitutes a species's differentiation. For example, forming "thinking" for "animal" so that it becomes "human". Natural body means a false body (for example, a human statue). The container (instrument, '*aliy*) means the body's limitation, which becomes the soul's actuality. While "having the potential for life" means having the potential to grow, absorb nutrients, reproduce, move with the will, and sense (Miswari, 2016b)

Despite being the ultimate perfection of the soul, the material body is a composite of the soul (Wildan, 2018). For example, the survival of the body depends on absorbing nutrients because the survival of the body depends on matter. A person's self is whole because the self is the soul, while the body is composite. Losing a particular body part does not cause a person to become incomplete. While the soul's survival also does not depend on the body, the body is only an instrument of preparation for the presence of the soul (Gama, 2018, p. 131). For example, someone once knew something, then he forgot. Then, he can recall it without needing the body to sense it again (Sadra, 2002d, pp. 225–226). This shows that knowledge is immaterial; perception, imagination, estimation, and intelligence are the powers of the soul. One of the scribes of Mullâ Sadrâ's teachings, Jawâdî Amûlî, said that every determinant of a species is the substance, the soul is the determinant of the species, then the soul is the substance (Amuli, 1386).

Mullâ Sadrâ describes the power of the human soul as something very remarkable. In addition to being able to control the object of knowledge in the mental realm, even a person with a powerful divine presence is able to manifest what is present into the mental realm for actual in the external realm. This ability can occur because a holy human being is a good emanation for *wujûd Ilahi* (Ramin, 2019).

Real knowledge is not acquired by chance, because accidents are undeniably accepted as projections of intellect, and knowledge is in its form. So, knowledge is the presence of *wujûd* in *wujûd*, so *wujûd* is something unique. The soul's power forms an accident of with the uniqueness of the human soul, which is also part of the unity of *wujûd*, creating pluralism. As a result, the human soul's power is a unique gift; the ability to make predictions, including negative predictions, is part of the soul's greatness. In an explanation of the concept of *Ittihad Aqil wa Ma'qûl*, Mullâ Sadrâ explained:

*"Forms in the object of reason are abstract (immaterial), either through the abstraction of matter by a subject or have been present from the beginning in them. They are actual objects of reason, whether or not they are apprehended by a subject's mind from external reality."* (Sadra, 2002c)

The previous explanation demonstrates that the object of knowledge is not something immaterial, but rather the existence of *wujûd* derived from the creativity of the soul. The soul is a component of *wujûd*. In *wujûd*, all occurrences of knowledge or things involved in knowledge occur, namely the, the known object, and the relationship between the two known as knowledge. In reality, knowledge knowing subject is the expansion of the soul.

The characteristic of *hushûlî* knowledge is the projection of the soul's creativity through certain faculties of the soul, which is actually *hudhûrî* knowledge. Assume someone is unaware that plurality is a mental projection. In that case, the soul will always feel restless because it does not understand that he is creating a barrier for himself, which is actually part of the unity of *wujûd* on the object of his knowledge, which is actually also part of the unity of *wujûd*. Such a soul always produces negative delusions; while the soul that has understood itself as the subject of knowledge and the object of knowledge is a unified *wujûd*, it can always create positive views. On the other hand, the soul in this category recognizes that all projections of *wujûd* are not the same as the true reality of *wujûd*. As a result, the viewpoint that must always be expressed is, "Glory be to You, I do not know You perfectly." (Khair, 2021)

## CONCLUSION

Mullâ Sadrâ utilizes various pieces of Islamic knowledge in developing his teachings. He made a lot of criticism of the multiple variants of Islamic intellectuals. Furthermore, he drew a lot of inspiration from these various pieces of knowledge. He built his philosophical system by synthesizing different thought variants so that the concepts in his philosophy must be built with broad and deep ideas. Mullâ Sadrâ created his philosophical system by combining multiple lines of thought, so broad and deep ideas must support the concepts in his philosophy. As a

result, Mullā Sadrā does not need to be concerned about the community of readers of his work, even though it is written in a heavy and complicated system.

The six concepts that make up the philosophical theory of *Al-Hikmah Al-Muta'alliyah*, namely: the fundamental of *wujūd* (*Ashalat al-Wujūd*), the gradation of *wujūd* (*Tâskikal-Wujūd*), the poverty of cause (*Illiyah*), the simple reality (*Basith al-Haqīqah*), the substance movement (*al-Harakah al-Jawhayiah*), and the unity of subject and object (*Ittihad Aqil wa Ma'qul*). These concepts demonstrate that Mulla Sadra's philosophy has strong conceptual roots and is difficult to refute. As a result, Mulla Sadra's philosophy remains one of the most influential groups of Islamic philosophy.

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